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INTRODUCTION
When a party enters into a contract his consent to the transaction is based on
the circumstances surrounding his own personal affairs. Indeed his consent
may be based on any number of motivating factors, which inform his
intentions and provide the backdrop and indeed the reason for his
agreement. For instance, the father of a bride may buy furniture for the home
of a prospective son-in-law, believing that he is about to marry his daughter.
The planned marriage provides the motivation for the father to enter into the
contract of sale. What if there is an error in the motive of the contracting
father: unbeknown to him the wedding has been called off, removing the
reason for his purchase? Should a unilateral error in motive of this type
invalidate the transaction? The answer is of course ‘no’: a unilateral error in
motive does not affect the validity of the contract, for this would have a very
negative impact on commercial certainty.1 Even though the error may have
been fundamental, in the sense that the party would not have contracted but
for this error in motive, a unilateral error in motive has no effect on a
contract.
The position is different, however, where the motivating factor is
common to both parties. If a contract is based upon a common assumption,
the contract may be void if that common assumption proves false.2 For the
contract to be void, however, the common assumption must also be
material, in the sense that neither party would have contracted but for the
assumption. This type of common assumption is referred to as a supposition.
At the outset we must also state that while a material supposition about a past
* BA LLB LLM (Cape Town).
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1 See, for example, African Realty Trust v Holmes 1922 AD 389 at 403: ‘But, as a
court, we are after all not concerned with the motives which actuated the parties in
entering into the contract, except in so far as they were expressly made part and parcel
of the contract or are part of the contract by clear implication.’
2 Fourie v CDMO Homes 1982 (1) SA 21 (A); Van Reenen Steel (Pty) Ltd v Smith
NO 2002 (4) SA264 (SCA).
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or present fact renders the contract void if it proves false; if, however, the
supposition relates to the future, then according to the latest SCA
judgements, the supposition must also be a term of the contract.3 The various
forms which suppositions can take are best illustrated with the aid of
examples.
First, consider a sale of immovable property which is situated near a river.4
The property is to be used for agricultural purposes, so an important factor in
the sale is whether the property has pump rights from this river. There is an
element of uncertainty as to whether the pump rights exist and therefore the
seller is not prepared to warrant their existence, but the parties enter into
their agreement on the supposition that the rights exist. In other words, the
existence of pump rights is the basis on which the contract rests. It would
appear at first glance to be a condition, but remember that a condition relates
to an uncertain future event.5 Since the existence of pump rights is a fact
which either does or does not exist at the time of contracting, it is referred to
as a supposition.
Secondly, consider a case where a son has bought two identical Plymouth
motor cars from different dealers, both on hire purchase agreements.6 He
sells one but exchanges the other for a car owned by his father. The son then
defaults on his payment for the cars. One of the dealers attaches the car in the
father’s possession, incorrectly believing it to be the vehicle it had sold to the
son. In fact, the car which the dealership should have attached was the other
one which the son had sold. Neither the dealer nor the father realizes the
error. The father pays the outstanding balance to the dealer to recover the
attached car. Clearly there has been a common mistake here in making
payment by way of settlement, since both the dealer and the father are
mistaken as to the identity of the attached car. No uncertainty exists in the
minds of the parties as to the identity of the car: the payment is made under
the common assumption that the car is the property of the dealer. Again we
have a supposition, although this time there is no uncertainty in the minds of
the parties. The supposition relates to the identity of the motor vehicle,
which is a fact existing at the time of conclusion of the contract. This
situation would appear to be different to the first scenario, although clearly
we are again dealing with a common assumption relating to a fact existing in
the present. This type of scenario is usually referred to as common mistake,
since the supposition which both parties labour under is commonly held and
incorrect.
The effect of a fundamental supposition relating to a present fact has been
settled by the Appellate Division and is more or less trite law: if the
3 Van Reenen Steel supra note 2 para 8; Transnet Ltd v Rubenstein 2006 (1) SA 591
(SCA) para 29.
4 Fourie supra note 2.
5 J C de Wet & A H van Wyk Die Suid-Afrikaanse Kontraktereg en Handelsreg vol 1 5
ed (1992) distinguish a supposition from a condition at 154.
6 Dickinson Motors v Oberholzer 1952 (1) SA443 (A).
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supposition fails, the contract is void.7 The effect on a contract of a
supposition as to a future fact has had a far more controversial history in
South Africa, however. It is this much maligned construction on which I
wish to focus in this article.
HISTORICAL ROOTS AND COMPARATIVE LAW
For the historical roots of the concept of a supposition, one should begin
with the continental European ius commune doctrine known as clausula
rebus sic stantibus. This doctrine provided a limitation to the rule of pacta
sunt servanda, with the result that an agreement would no longer be binding
if an unforeseen change of circumstances upset the foundation on which the
promise was based.8 In modern legal literature, however, the country with
the most-developed concept of suppositions is Germany, and hence I will
focus my investigation of suppositions on that country, beginning with the
work of Bernard Windscheid (who is often quoted in South African
discussions of suppositions, particularly the supposition in futuro).9 In 1850
Windscheid put forward his theory of presuppositions10 in a monograph
entitled Die Lehre des römischen Rechts von der Voraussetzung.11 The essence of
this theory was that when a contracting party makes his contractual promise,
he assumes that the intended legal consequences will occur only in certain
circumstances. Therefore, an assumption exists that the circumstances will
remain unchanged, although this is not elevated to a term of the contract and
thereby made an express condition. If the other party to the contract had
realized that this assumption had been fundamental for the promisor, then
the promisor should not be bound by the agreement if his presupposition
was falsified by a change in circumstances. Thus the contract was concluded
under a condition that the circumstances remain unchanged, which is why
Windscheid referred to the presupposition as an inchoate condition
(unentwickelte Bedingung).
While Windscheid’s presupposition had thus to be material to the
contract, it was not a term of the contract, nor even necessarily a common
7 See for example Dickinson Motors supra note 6 and Fourie supra note 2.
8 For a good discussion of the clausula rebus sic stantibus in English, see Robert
Feenstra ‘Impossibilitas and clausula rebus sic stantibus’ in Alan Watson (ed) Daube
Noster (1974) 77.
9 African Realty Trust supra note 1 cites Windscheid’s doctrine of the Vorausset-
zung in a discussion of whether ‘[t]here is authority for the proposition that when the
basis of a contract falls away the contract falls away with it’ (at 400). See also Schalk
van der Merwe & L F van Huyssteen (1985) 48 THRHR 469, where Windscheid’s
Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts is cited at 471. (See note 11 below.)
10 This is a translation of the German term Voraussetzung which is used by Wind-
scheid. The translation is taken from Basil Markesinis The German Law of Contract
(2006), which discusses Windscheid’s doctrine at 320–3 and is the major source on
which I have drawn for my own discussion.
11 This theory is also discussed in Windscheid’s major treatise Lehrbuch des Pandek-
tenrechts 9 ed by Kipp (1906) § 97.
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assumption. It was merely a unilateral motive which was known to the other
party. To many in Germany this struck at the root of contractual certainty
and Windscheid’s theory was subjected to much criticism. Indeed the
Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (Civil Code), promulgated on 1 January 1900, made
no mention of such a doctrine of presuppositions and there was thus no
mechanism to deal with changed circumstances. History, however, vindi-
cated Windscheid’s ideas. Economic collapse followed Germany’s defeat in
World War I and hyper-inflation resulted. This necessitated a doctrine to deal
with changed circumstances, since the enforcement of deals brokered prior
to the collapse would have resulted in widespread injustice and economic
ruin for contractants who had not foreseen the change in Germany’s
circumstances. Oertmann’s theory of the so-called Wegfall der Geschäfts-
grundlage was published in 1921 and was seized upon by the courts as the
answer to the crisis they faced.12 This theory also rested on supposition: the
motivating factor in the mind of one party must become obvious to the other
party and be acquiesced in by him during the course of negotiations.13
Should the supposition prove false due, for example, to a change in
circumstances, the contract would fall away.14 Rather than a motive being
privately entertained, as was possible in Windscheid’s theory, it now had to
be manifested during contractual negotiations. Oertmann’s theory survives
today in German jurisprudence, although it has been developed by the
courts.15
Germany thus provides an essential case study in the field of suppositions,
particularly the supposition in futuro. The interesting aspect as far as South
Africa is concerned is that Germany originally also chose to reject the
supposition in futuro on the grounds of contractual certainty, but was
subsequently forced to adapt its law relating to supervening circumstances. In
South Africa there is scant authority for a doctrine to deal with changed
circumstances along the lines of the German doctrine outlined above, or
indeed the comparable English doctrine of frustration. With this lacuna in
mind, the decision in Williams v Evans16 is of particular interest. In this case a
South African court decided that the supposition in futuro did exist and that
‘the proposition that when the basis of a contract falls away the contract falls
away with it’17 did indeed hold true in South African law.
WILLIAMS V EVANS AND THE RESULTANT DEBATE
Consider now the facts of Williams v Evans: Evans (the respondent) was the
owner of a dairy in Plettenberg Bay. Evans entered into an agreement with
12 Paul Oertmann Die Geschäftsgrundlage (1921) 37.
13 Ibid at 28ff and 38.
14 Ibid at 161.
15 Thus § 313 BGB (Störung der Geschäftsgrundlage) can be seen as based on
Oertmann’s theory.
16 1978 (1) SA1170 (C).
17 African Realty Trust supra note 1 at 400.
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Williams (the applicant) acknowledging his debt to her. The agreement
made provision for Williams to provide security to the Standard Bank at
Plettenberg Bay, in order that Evans’s business could obtain overdraft
facilities from that bank. It was a common assumption between Williams and
Evans that if Williams provided security, Evans would be able to obtain an
overdraft. The bank did not oblige, however, and despite Williams’s security,
Evans could not obtain an overdraft. Evans then argued that since the
common assumption had proved false, the agreement between himself and
Williams was void.
For Broeksma J the case turned on
‘whether there is authoritative support for [Evans’s] contention that where a
contract is entered into on the basis of a common assumption as to a future state
of affairs, it may fail if the assumption or supposition fails and it is established
that the parties would not have entered into the agreement had they known
that their expectations would not materialize’.18
The judge went on to decide this question in the affirmative.19 What
Williams v Evans thus established was that, in addition to a supposition
relating to the present (or past) of the two types described above, the contract
would also be void where the parties contract on the basis of a common
assumption about the future, provided this assumption was fundamental —
in the sense that neither party would have entered into the contract had he or
she known the true state of affairs. The authority for this proposition,
however, appears on closer inspection to be rather scant. The major support
for Broeksma J’s finding lay in the writing of an academic author, Wouter de
Vos,20 who had discussed suppositions in contract law in an article which
attempted to resolve the issue of reclaiming payments made when not due.
De Vos mentions in passing the different forms which a supposition may take
and seems to support the future construction.21 As far as actual case authority
goes, there was reference in Williams v Evans to several cases, although most
of these dealt with common mistake and suppositions about a present fact.22
There was no direct case authority for the type of supposition in futuro that
18 At 1174H.
19 At 1175E–F.
20 Wouter de Vos ‘Solutio indebiti en eiendomsoorgang’ 1976 TSAR 79. An
extract from page 82 of this article is quoted in Williams at 1175A–C.
21 Ibid at 82. This article does not seem to provide strong motivation for the
supposition in futuro. That De Vos was clearly in favour of this construction appears
more clearly from his unpublished notes on contract law General Principles of the Law of
Contract (1977) 99–101.
22 In particular Broeksma J referred to Dickinson Motors supra note 6; Dutch
Reformed Church Council v Crocker 1953 (4) SA53 (C); and Fienberg v Jardine 1915 NPD
439.
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Broeksma J was dealing with, and this lack of direct authority was the source
of much criticism in later cases.23
Within the Cape Provincial Division the debate about the supposition in
futuro continued. In Osman v Standard Bank National Credit Corporation Ltd24
Friedman J stated the following:
‘If a contract is entered into on the basis of a common assumption as to a past,
present or future state of affairs, and that assumption turns out to be unfounded,
the contract will be void.’25
Friedman J relied on Williams v Evans as authority for this statement. In
Hare’s Brickfields Ltd v Cape Town City Council,26 however, two judges of the
Cape Provincial Division expressly overruled Williams’s case. In Hare’s
Brickfields it was pleaded that there had been an assumption about a future
event which had proved false and hence should void the contract. Van den
Heever J distinguished conditions from common assumptions, on the basis
that when dealing with a fact which exists in the present one is dealing with a
common assumption, whereas if the fact exists in the future, one is dealing
with a condition.27 The judge stated that in so far as Williams v Evans had
stated that a common assumption could relate to the future that case was
wrong. The pleadings should rather have alleged a condition as to the future
and in the result were ‘confusing’.28
A case from the Natal Provincial Division also supported the distinction
between suppositions and conditions. In Sonarep (SA) (Pty) Ltd v Motorcraft
(Pty) Ltd29 the court distinguished suppositions as to the future from the
conventional supposition as to the present. In this case too the court held that
a supposition in futuro is ‘indistinguishable from a condition’.30
The case authority thus did not seem to favour the supposition in futuro.
There was, however, no clear Appellate Division verdict on the matter.
Academic opinion on the usefulness of this type of supposition remained
divided. Van der Merwe and Van Huyssteen defended this concept in a
criticism of the Hare’s Brickfields case.31 These authors argued that the
supposition in futuro should be maintained and they attacked the classifica-
tion of a supposition as to the future under the broad banner of conditions.
23 See Hare’s Brickfields Ltd v Cape Town City Council 1985 (1) SA 769 (C) at 781 for
a detailed analysis of all the authority cited in support of Williams v Evans. Van den
Heever J distinguished all cases cited and overruled Williams’s case.
24 1985 (2) SA378 (C).
25 At 386B–C.
26 Supra note 23.
27 This distinction draws on the writing of De Wet & Van Wyk op cit note 5 at 154.
The distinction drawn by these authors between a condition and a supposition was
approved in Fourie supra note 2 at 27 and in Hare’s Brickfields supra note 23 at 780I-
781B.
28 At 781F.
29 1981 (1) SA889 (N).
30 At 902F.
31 Op cit note 9.
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The crux of their argument was that there was a clear distinction between a
supposition in futuro and a condition, since with a condition there is
uncertainty in the minds of the contractants as to whether the future event
will occur, whereas with this type of supposition there is no uncertainty:32
the parties simply assume the envisaged state of affairs will come about. The
use of the supposition in futuro hence gives effect to the intention of the
parties at the time of entering into the contract, which is not to provide for a
contingency, but to confidently bring an agreement into being.
Kerr also argued in favour of Williams v Evans.33 He based his position on
the decision of the Appellate Division in Sishen Hotel (Edms) Bpk v Suid
Afrikaanse Yster en Staal Industriele Korporasie Bpk.34 This case concerned a
change in circumstances for a hotel business operating on leased premises.
During the currency of a twenty year lease of property situated on a national
road, the road was diverted, with disastrous consequences for the hotel
business. The landlord (a mining company) was responsible for the diversion
and was held to be in breach of the contract of lease, for failure to ensure the
undisturbed use (commodus usus) of the property. The tenant company was
awarded damages. Kerr argues that this unforeseen change of circumstances
meant that although the situation was not quite one of impossibility, the
contract had to come to an end.35 By the same token Kerr argues that
Williams v Evans must be correct, since the contract in Sishen Hotel was based
upon the common assumption that the hotel premises would remain
adjacent to a national road: if those conditions ceased to exist, the contract
ceased to exist.36 This was in terms of Kerr’s broader notion of frustration of
purpose, conceived along English lines, a doctrine which could be given
effect to by validating suppositions in futuro, as his argument above suggests.
While Kerr’s position has received judicial attention,37 his views have not
been widely received and are based, I submit, on tenuous authority. Other
textbook writers, such as Van der Merwe et al, remains more circumspect on
the validity of Williams v Evans.38 Christie, by contrast, was dead against the
finding in that case: he felt that there was no ‘justifiable’ difference between
32 Ibid at 471.
33 A J Kerr ‘Impairment of profitability of premises let; implied contractual provi-
sions; standing of Pothier’ (1987) 104 SALJ 550.
34 1987 (2) SA932 (A).
35 Kerr op cit note 33 at 552.
36 Kerr op cit note 33 at 552–3.
37 See Kok v Osborne 1993 (4) SA 788 (SEC) at 801J-802E, where Kerr’s argument
that South Africa recognizes a doctrine of frustration of purpose comparable to that in
English law is accepted. Kerr’s position on frustration of purpose is set out in the
article referred to above (note 33) as well as in his textbook Principles of the Law of
Contract 6 ed (2002) at 545–52.
38 Schalk van der Merwe et al Contract — General Principles 3 ed (2007) 285–6. G F
Lubbe & C M Murray Farlam and Hathaway — Contract: Cases, Materials and Commen-
tary 3 ed (1988) 444–6 cite the Sonarep case (supra note 29) and ask the question: ‘Is
the statement in Sonarep that the term in question [an alleged supposition] was ‘‘indis-
tinguishable’’ from a condition convincing?’ (at 445n1)
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the supposition in futuro and a tacit term or condition, echoing the approach
in, for example, Hare’s Brickfields.39
This is largely where the matter thus stood before the Supreme Court of
Appeal ruled on the matter in Van Reenen Steel: there was the old precedent
of Williams v Evans, which, although overruled by Hare’s Brickfields and
contradicted in Sonarep, lent some weight to the opinions of various
academics discussed above that a supposition in futuro could exist. The Van
Reenen Steel case provides a clear ruling against this, however, to which I
must now turn.
THE NEW APPROACH: VAN REENEN STEEL (PTY) LTD V
SMITH NO
The Van Reenen Steel case concerned a sale of a business. Smith was the
executor in the deceased estate of the majority shareholder in this business,
Mortech Industries (Pty) Ltd. Smith knew this company was in a dire
financial position and wished to liquidate it or sell the estate’s interest in it.
One of the minority shareholders, who also happened to be the managing
director, agreed to buy the estate’s shares with the financial backing of Van
Reenen Steel (Pty) Ltd. Van Reenen Steel undertook a ‘due diligence’ of the
company before agreeing to the purchase. Van Reenen, the managing
director of the purchasing company, undertook this ‘due diligence’ himself.
When it subsequently transpired that Mortech Industries was in a less
favourable financial position than this ‘due diligence’ had suggested, Van
Reenen Steel tried to back out of the deal, arguing that there was a common
mistake between the seller and purchaser as to the viability of the company. It
also argued, in the alternative, that there had been a fundamental common
assumption as to the value of the company being purchased, which had
proved false.
As the court noted, Van Reenen Steel could not rely on a unilateral
mistake, since Smith had not been the cause of its error.40 Similarly there
could be no common mistake; since Van Reenen Steel had undertaken the
risk as to the verity of the financial statements, these statements were
immaterial to Smith: he would have sold the business regardless.41 The error
in question was held to have been a unilateral error in motive, with no effect
on the contract.42
In reaching this decision, however, Harms JA considered the argument
that a common assumption existed between the parties. In his judgement he
discussed the status of the supposition in futuro, quoting from the earlier
39 R H Christie The Law of Contract in South Africa 5 ed (2006) 328. This passage,
which contains Christie’s opinion on the developments in Williams v Evans, has been
updated to reflect the latest case law, but the sentiment remains unchanged from
earlier editions.
40 Van Reenen Steel supra note 2 para 7.
41 Paragraph 13.
42 Paragraph 9.
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decision in the Sonarep case and affirmed the distinction drawn there
between suppositions and conditions:
‘Assumptions or suppositions can have many forms and have different effects
depending upon the circumstances. An assumption relating to a future state of
affairs ‘‘relates to an agreement which is in operation and its recognition would
have a direct bearing upon one of the terms of the agreement. Such a
supposition is indistinguishable from a condition’’, [Footnote: Sonarep (SA)
(Pty) Ltd v Motorcraft (Pty) Ltd 1981 (1) SA 889 (N) at 902F, a full court
decision.] usually a resolutive condition, perhaps also a condition precedent or
an ordinary term of the contract. [Footnote: Williams v Evans 1978 (1) SA 1170
(C) at 1174F–1175F is consequently wrong.] The use of the word ‘‘supposi-
tion’’ or ‘‘assumption’’ instead of ‘‘condition’’ in this context is not conducive to
clear thinking.’43
Thus finally there was a pronouncement, although obiter, from the
Supreme Court of Appeal on this issue. This statement was then followed by
the following finding in the recent case of Transnet Ltd v Rubenstein:44
‘A supposition, to have legal effect, must translate into a mistake, a
misrepresentation, a term or a condition (and the term or condition may be
express or tacit).’45
In the Transnet case the respondent had been granted the right to operate a
jewellery boutique on the Blue Train, which is a special train service run by
Transnet. This right was conferred until such time as the Blue Train service
would be privatized. Transnet, attempting to escape the contract, alleged that
there had been a supposition in futuro that the train service would be
privatized by the end of 1999. This had not happened. The respondent
attempted to hold Transnet to the original terms of the contract. Cloete JA in
his minority judgment (concurred in by Zulman JA alone) found for the
respondent, since Transnet had failed to allege the existence of a tacit term
containing the supposition for which they had argued.46 The majority
dismissed the argument as to the existence of a supposition47 and decided the
case on different grounds.
Thus, at last, in a minority judgement, we have a decisive pronouncement
dealing with suppositions in futuro. Cloete JA indeed reproduced the
above-quoted passages from Van Reenen Steel, which deal with future, as well
as past and present, suppositions.48
43 Paragraph 8.
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CAN WILLIAMS V EVANS BE RECONCILED WITH THE NEW
APPROACH?
In the Transnet case, counsel for the appellant attempted to argue on the
authority of Wilkins NO v Voges49 that a tacit term containing the supposition
which they alleged was part of the agreement could be read into the
agreement in dispute. Cloete JA dismissed this contention on the basis that
the existence of a tacit term is a question of fact and that the facts in that case
did not support a finding that such a term existed.50 I would like to argue that
the concept of the supposition in futuro as found in Williams v Evans can be
reconciled with the finding in Van Reenen Steel that a supposition about a
future fact is indistinguishable from a resolutive condition. I would like to
follow the argument suggested by counsel in the Transnet case that such a
reconciliation lies in the concept of a tacit term.
Essentially in Williams v Evans it was held that where the parties base their
consensus upon an assumption about a fact which will only occur in the
future, the agreement will fall away if the assumption fails. A feature of this
ruling is that the assumption must form the basis of the transaction, in the
sense that neither party would have contracted had they known their
assumption would not materialize. Van Reenen Steel holds that if such an
assumption exists in the minds of the parties to an agreement, what we are
actually dealing with is a resolutive condition that the contract will fall away
should the future event not go as planned. Both Van Reenen Steel and Transnet
acknowledge that a supposition may have legal effect if it is a term of the
contract.51 Now consider the impact of a tacit term in this matrix: the
existence of a tacit term is a question of fact and is read into the contract if
both parties considered that term to be so obvious as not to need
mentioning.52 Indeed even if the parties never actually contemplated the
matter in question, the courts can still read in such a term.53 This is referred
to as an ‘imputed tacit term’.54
If the courts can read in a term which the parties never contemplated, but
which both would have approved of if they had thought about it, then surely
we are not far from reading into a contract a tacit resolutive condition that a
contract will come to an end if a given future fact does not materialize?55
This approach ties in with the finding of the court in Van Reenen Steel: is it so
49 1994 (3) SA130 (A).
50 Transnet supra note 3 para 30.
51 See the passages cited above.
52 The so-called hypothetical bystander test. See for example Dutch Reformed
Church Council supra note 22 at 63.
53 Van den Berg v Tenner 1975 (2) SA268 (A) at 277.
54 Wilkins NO v Voges supra note 49 at 136–7.
55 Consider the remarks of Nienaber (1965) 28 THRHR 149 at 151, where in a
discussion of implied terms (albeit in the context of common mistakes based upon an
incorrect common assumption), he states the following: ‘Waar die partye aldus
ooreenkom dat die kontrak in ’n gegewe geval geen werking sal hê nie, gee die reg
aan so ’n afspraak gevolg. Daar moet egter ’n beding in dier voege in die kontrak
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different from the finding in Williams v Evans? The latest SCA rulings stress
that the so-called supposition must satisfy the requirement of being a term of
the contract, but Williams v Evans maintains that the supposition must be
fundamental to the transaction. Given this feature, what if in Williams v Evans
there was a tacit imputed resolutive condition that the contract would fall
away if the bank did not grant Evans’s business overdraft facilities? It appears
the distinction drawn here by the courts is merely one of terminology, and
does not have much consequence when applied to a given factual matrix.
Given the above argument, the next step is to address the lacuna in South
African law when dealing with a fundamental change of circumstances.
What if there is a change in the factual matrix upon which the contracting
parties based their consensus, so that if they had contemplated this change at
the time of contracting, they would not have contracted on the given terms?
This question is addressed in English law by the doctrine of frustration,56 but
although this doctrine overlaps in part with our law of supervening
impossibility,57 there is clear precedent that frustration forms no part of
South African law.58 Can the supposition in futuro, whether as a common
assumption, or a tacit imputed resolutive condition, be used to deal with
changed circumstances in South African law, thereby giving results similar to
the English doctrine of frustration? Consider the words of Lubbe and
Murray:
‘Whether or not a supposition of the type described in the previous notes is
actually incorporated into a contract will usually depend on whether the test for
the existence of a tacit term is satisfied. This means that where the parties are
convinced of the existence of the state of affairs, one is concerned with an
imputed rather than an actual consensus. Resort to such a fiction leaves one but
a step away from holding that it is a naturale of contractual obligations that
liability depends on the existence of the matrix of facts which motivated the
contract. A further development would make the obligation depend on the
continued existence of that matrix of facts.’59
Whether or not this type of implied-term approach to suppositions is the
answer to our lack of a doctrine to deal with changed circumstances, it does
seem to reconcile Williams v Evans with the later case law. One may indeed,
in response to this argument, seemingly based on terminology, be moved to
ask what is so wrong with Williams v Evans and the much maligned
supposition in futuro?
opgeneem word en die toets daarvoor is die gewone toets wat vir stilswyende bedinge
gestel word.’
56 Kerr seems to favour reading this English approach into the SouthAfrican law to
deal with changed circumstances. See the brief discussion of Kerr’s position above for
references.
57 Nuclear Fuels Corporation of SA (Pty) Ltd v Orda 1996 (4) SA1190 (A) at 1214C.
58 See for example Techni-Pak Sales(Pty) Ltd v Hall 1968 (3) SA231 (W) at 238G–H.
59 Lubbe & Murray supra note 38 at 446.
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